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Walker v. True
399 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 2005)
I. Facts
A Virginia jury convicted Darick Demorris Walker of capital murder, and
the trial judge sentenced Walker to death.' In 1999 the Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed Walker's conviction and sentence.2 After Walker unsuccessfully
pursued state postconviction relief, in February 2002 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Walker's habeas corpus
petition.3 In June 2002 the United States Supreme Court decided Atkins v.
ViTinia,4 which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of the
mentally retarded.' On appeal to the United State Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, Walker for the first time contended that his execution would
violate the Eighth Amendment because he was mentally retarded.6 The Fourth
Circuit construed Walker's belated mental-retardation claim as a motion for
authorization to file a successive habeas petition with the district court and then
granted that motion.' In June 2003 the district court dismissed Walker's
amended habeas petition without holding an evidentiary hearing on the mental-
retardation claim.'
IL Holding
The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred when it dismissed
Walker's mental-retardation claim without an evidentiary hearing and therefore,
remanded the claim to the district court with instructions to conduct such a
hearing.9 The court, however, rejected Walker's additional claim that Ring v.
1. Walker v. True, 399 F.3d 315, 318 (4th Cir. 2005).
2. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-313 (Michie 2003) (requiring the Supreme Court of
Virginia to review all death sentences); Walker v. Commonwealth, 515 S.E.2d 565, 577 (Va. 1999)
(finding no error by the trial court and affirming Walker's conviction and sentence).
3. Walker v. True, 67 Fed. Appx. 758, 761 (4th Cir. 2003).
4. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
5. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,321 (2002); see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.'.
6. Walker, 399 F.3d at 318.
7. Id.; see also Walker, 67 Fed. Appx. at 770 (permitting Walker to file a successive habeas
petition to assert his mental retardation claim).
8. Walker, 399 F.3d at 318.
9. Id.
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AriZona' ° and Virginia's statutory scheme required that a jury determine his
mental-retardation claim on remand." Further, the court rejected Walker's
contention that Virginia's statutory scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause
by providing jury determinations to defendants still able to bring their mental-
retardation claim in state courts, but not to those who must raise their claim in
federal courts."
III. Analysis
A. Dismissal of Walker's Mental-Retardation Claim Without an Evideniagy Heating
Walker's primary assertion was that the district court erred when it dis-
missed his mental-retardation claim without an evidentiary hearing. 3 The district
court dismissed Walker's claim because "the evidence presented by Walker [was]
insufficient to conclude, by a preponderance of evidence, that he is mentally
retarded."' 4 Although a district court may dismiss a claim when the facts alleged
clearly would not satisfy Virginia's standard for mental retardation, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that dismissal was improper in this case because Walker alleged
facts that, if taken as true, established both "significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning" and that he suffered from "significant limitations in adaptive
behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills."' 5
Specifically, the Fourth Circuit took issue with the manner in which the
district court reviewed the I.Q. scores that Walker introduced. 6 Virginia's
10. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
11. Walker, 399 F.3d at 325; seeRingv. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,609 (2002) (holding that a jury
must determine any aggravating factor that is necessary for the imposition of the death penalty).
12. Walker, 399 F.3d at 325-26.
13. Id. at 318. The Fourth Circuit first noted that the deferential standards of review under
28 U.S.C. § 2254 did not apply because the claim had been raised for the first time in Walker's
habeas petition and that instead the court would review Walker's claim de novo. Id. at 319; see 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000) (providing that the deferential standard of review only applies to claims
adjudicated on the merits in state court; part of AEDPA). Further, because the claim arose on a
motion to dismiss, the court accepted all the facts pleaded by Walker as true. Walker, 399 F.3d at
319. Additionally, although Walker had brought the claim in federal court, the court determined
whether Walker was mentally retarded using Virginia's definition of mental retardation. Id.
14. Walker, 399 F.3d at 321.
15. Id. at 319-20 (citing VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (Michie 2004)); seeVA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-264.3:1.1 (requiring that defendants display "significantly subaverage intellectual functioning
as demonstrated by performance on a standardized measure of intellectual functioning... that is
at least two standard deviations below the mean" in order to qualify as mentally retarded). Walker
had introduced various I.Q. tests, two of which he alleged fell two standard deviations below the
mean. Walker, 399 F.3d at 321. In another test, Walker had scored an 86 but introduced expert
testimony stating that the results were unreliable and should be discarded. Id. at 323. Additionally,
Walker had scored a 77 in 2000 and qualified that score with the examining doctor's opinion that
Walker was mentally retarded. Id.
16. Walker, 399 F.3d at 321-24.
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definition of mental retardation permits defendants to show "significantly sub-
average intellectual functioning" by establishing that he scored "two standard
deviations below the mean" on a standard I.Q. test. 7 An I.Q. of 70 is generally
considered to be two standard deviations below the mean.' The Fourth Circuit
first determined that the district court did not take the facts alleged by Walker as
true when it refused to consider Walker's score of 61 on a test taken in May
2003.19 The district court did not consider the score because Walker took the
test when he was 30 and Virginia's statute requires that mental retardation be
manifested before the age of 18.20 The court implied that the district court
should have considered Walker's score of 61 even though it came after the age
of 18.21
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court erred by
failing to consider the effect on Walker's I.Q. scores of the so-called "Flynn
Effect" or of the standard of error inherent in I.Q. tests.' Walker introduced a
score of 76 in an I.Q. test he took in 1984.23 He then explained that the score of
76 actually fell two standard deviations below the mean because the "Flynn
Effect" adjustment of the score down to a 72 and the standard error of measure-
ment inherent in I.Q. tests brings the upper range of I.Q. scores qualifying as
mentally retarded to 75.24 The Fourth Circuit thus determined that the facts
alleged by Walker, if taken as true, would have brought his I.Q. score two
standard deviations below the mean.2 The court instructed the district court, on
remand, to evaluate whether Walker's "Flynn Effect" argument was valid and
whether Virginia's statute permits the consideration of the standard of error
inherent in I.Q. tests.
2 6
B. Juy Determination of Mental Retardation
Walker next contended that, on remand to the district court, Virginia's
statutory scheme required that a jury determine Walker's mental-retardation
claim. 7 The court first noted that the statute does not permit defendants in
17. Id. at 320 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1).
18. Id. at 321-22.
19. Id. at 321.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Walker, 399 F.3d at 322-23.
23. Id. at 322.
24. Id. The "Flynn Effect" refers to studies indicating that outdated I.Q. tests may greatly
overstate a test taker's I.Q. score due to increasing average I.Q. scores in the general population.
Walton v. Johnson, 269 F. Supp. 2d 692, 699 n.5 (W.D. Va. 2003).
25. Walker, 399 F.3d at 322-23.
26. Id. at 323.
27. Id. at 324.
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Walker's position to bring their claim in state court. 28 Although Virginia Code
section 8.01-654.2 allows defendants to bring their mental-retardation claims in
state court if they were sentenced to death prior to April 29, 2003, and have not
completed both their direct appeal and state habeas proceedings, the statute
requires defendants to bring their claims in federal court if they have already
exhausted state habeas review.2 9 Further, the court explained that Virginia Code
section 19.2-264.3:1.1 (C), which requires a jury to determine mental retardation
if the defendant's trial was before a jury, applies only to claims brought in state
court.30 Thus, the court concluded that Virginia Code section 19.2-264.3:1.1 (C)
had no bearing on whether the defendant was entitled to a jury determination in
federal court and consequently Virginia's statutory scheme did not require that
a jury determine Walker's mental-retardation claim on remand in district court.
31
Walker also claimed that the court should interpret Virginia's statutory
scheme as providing him with a jury determination on remand because the
statutory scheme would otherwise violate the Equal Protection Clause.3 2 Walker
argued that there is no rational basis for a statute that withholds juries from
defendants who have completed their state habeas proceedings but provides
juries to defendants who not have completed their state habeas proceedings.33
The court noted that United States Supreme Court precedent requires it to
determine whether the" 'classification drawn by the statute is rationally related
to a legitimate state interest.' ,,3 The court determined that the statute was
rationally related to the state's interest in "efficient utilization of its judicial
resources." 35 Thus, Virginia's statutory scheme did not violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.
36
Dissenting in part and concurring in the judgement, Judge Gregory con-
tended that Virginia Code section 8.01-654.2 violated the Equal Protection
Clause.37 Contrary to the majority's decision to apply rationality review to the
statutory classification, Judge Gregory argued that strict scrutiny review was
appropriate because the statute infringed on a defendant's constitutional right not
to be executed if mentally retarded.38 Under a strict scrutiny review, the statutory
28. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-654.2 (Michie Supp. 2004)).
29. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-654.2).
30. Id. at 324-25 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (C) (Michie 2004)).
31. Walker, 399 F.3d at 325.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (quoting City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Walker, 399 F.3d at 327-28 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 328.
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classification must be" 'suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.' "3
Judge Gregory rejected the Commonwealth's contention that it had a compelling
interest in providing finality and avoiding delay in judgements. 4° Further, even
if the Commonwealth's reasons were sufficient, the statute was not narrowly
tailored to serve those interests.4' Judge Gregory contended that forcing federal
courts to harmonize Virginia's mental-retardation statute with federal habeas
procedures may actually prolong the time it takes to adjudicate petitioners'
mental-retardation claims.42 He also urged the district court to permit a jury to
determine Walker's claim even if a jury determination was not required.43
Finally, Walker claimed that Ring required that a jury determine his mental-
retardation claim.' The Supreme Court in Ring held that a jury must determine
the existence of any aggravating factor that is necessary to impose a sentence of
death.45 Walker claimed that the absence of mental retardation was the equiva-
lent of such an aggravating factor because the court could not impose a death
sentence without a finding that he was not mentally retarded.46 First, the Fourth
Circuit questioned whether Ring applied because Walker's conviction had become
final before the Supreme Court decided Ring and the Court in Schriro v.
Summerlin47 held that Ring [did] not apply retroactively.4" Walker, however,
contended that he was not seeking retroactive application of Ring because he
raised his mental-retardation claim for the first time in district court after Ring
was decided.4 9 Because the court was unsure whether this was a retroactive
application of Ring, it addressed the merits of whether Ring required a jury to
determine Walker's claim.
50
The court first acknowledged that Virginia's statute setting the authorized
punishments for class one felonies supports Walker's claim because it states that
"'[f]or class 1 felonies, [the punishment may be] death, ifthe person so convictedwas
16 years of age or older at the time of the offense and is not determined to be mentaly
retarded.' .... However, the court stated that "the finding of mental retardation
does not increase the penalty for the crime beyond the statutory maximum-
39. Id. (quoting Cleburme Lhing Or., 473 U.S. at 440)).
40. Id. at 328-29.
41. Id. at 329.
42. Id.
43. Walker, 399 F.3d at 329 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
44. Walker, 399 F.3d at 325-26.
45. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
46. Walker, 399 F.3d at 326.
47. 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004).
48. Walker, 399 F.3d at 325 (citing Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2526 (2004)).
49. Id. at 325-26.
50. Id. at 326.
51. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10 (Michie 2004) (alteration by Fourth Circuit)).
2005]
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death;" rather, it only decreases the permissible punishment.5 2 Further, the
prosecution has no duty to prove that the defendant is not mentally retarded if
the defendant does not raise the issue. 3 Thus, the court concluded that Ring
does not require that a jury determine Walker's mental-retardation claim on
remand. 4
IV. Appication in Viginia
Although the Fourth Circuit did not require the district court to adjust the
defendant's I.Q. scores according to the "Flynn Effect" and the standard of error
inherent in I.Q. tests, the court did require the district court to consider whether
these effects should be factored into Walker's I.Q. test scores.5 5 The "Flynn
Effect" posits that I.Q. tests that have not been updated for some time tend to
overstate the test taker's I.Q. due to generally increasing I.Q. scores across the
nation.5 6 In Walton v. Johnson,57 the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia also addressed the "Flynn Effect" but, like the Walker court,
did not expressly hold that courts should apply it to I.Q. scores derived from
outdated I.Q. tests. 8 Other state courts, however, have credited the "Flynn
Effect" and used it to determine whether a given defendant's I.Q. score falls two
standard deviations below the mean. 9 Although studies regarding the "Flynn
Effect" are ongoing, whenever a defendant has taken an outdated I.Q. test,
counsel should investigate whether the effect calls for a downward adjustment
in the defendant's I.Q. score.'
Walker also argued that Virginia Code section 8.01-654.2 violated the Equal
Protection Clause by guaranteeing a jury determination for a mental-retardation
claim raised on state direct or habeas appeal, while denying it to those required
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Walker, 399 F.3d at 326.
55. Id. at 323-24.
56. See LaJuana Davis, Death Penay Appeals and Post-Contition Proceeding: Intel'gence Testing and
Atkins: Considerations for Appellate Courts and Appellate Lanyers, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 297,
309-10 (2003) (explaining the "Flynn Effect").
57. 269 F. Supp. 2d 692 (W.D. Va. 2003).
58. Walton, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 699 n.5.
59. See, e.g., People v. Vidal, 124 Cal. App. 4th 806, 851 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that
courts must consider the "Flynn Effect" in determining whether a defendant's I.Q. score falls two
standard deviations below the mean and adding that the "Flynn Effect" is generally accepted within
the field).
60. See Davis, supra note 56, at 309-10 (noting that courts must consider the "Flynn Effect"
on I.Q. scores derived from I.Q. tests that have not been re-normed recendy).
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by statute to bring their claim in federal court.6' In Burns v. Warden ("Burns ),62
the Supreme Court of Virginia's analysis of Virginia Code section 8.01-654.2
initially seemed to provide support for Walker's claim.63 In Burns I, the court
determined that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited Virginia from providing
juries to defendants who first raised their mental-retardation claim on direct
appeal, but not to defendants first raising the same claim in their state habeas
petitions.' Indeed, Judge Gregory, dissenting in Walker, cited Burns In arguing
that Virginia's statutory scheme for determining mental retardation violates the
Equal Protection Clause.6" The Walker majority, however, determined that the
statutory scheme did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.' After the Fourth
Circuit decided Walker, the Supreme Court of Virginia in Burns v. Warden67 ("Burns
Ir), on rehearing from the court's decision in Burns I, issued a revised opinion
that included no reference to the defendant's federal equal protection argument,
and held only that Virginia's statutory scheme requires that a jury determine a
defendant's mental-retardation claim if he first raised the claim on state habeas
review and his original trial was before a jury.68 Thus, unlike the Supreme Court
of Virginia's initial reasoning in Burns I, its revised opinion in Burns H6 does not
conflict with the Fourth Circuit's equal protection analysis in Walker.69
Finally the court determined that Ring does not require that a jury determine
mental-retardation claims.7" The decision is consistent with the Supreme Court
of Virginia's opinion in Winston v. Commonwealth,7' which held that the prosecu-
tion does not need to prove the absence of mental retardation beyond a reason-
61. Walker, 399 F.3d at 325; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-654.2 (Michie Supp. 2004) (requiring
defendants to bring their mental-retardation claim in federal court if their sentence was final before
April 29, 2003, and they have exhausted their direct appeals and state habeas proceedings).
62. 597 S.E.2d 195 (Va. 2004).
63. See Bums v. Warden, 597 S.E.2d 195, 195-96 (Va. 2004) [hereinafter Burns 11 (holding
that interpreting Virginia Code section 8.01-654.2 in a manner that does not provide a jury
determination to defendants who first raise their mental-retardation claim on state habeas appeal
would violate the Equal Protection Clause). Seegeneral/,Justin Shane, Case Note, 17 CAP. DEF.J.
205 (2004) (analyzing Bums v. Warden, 597 S.E.2d 195 (Va. 2004)).
64. Burns l, 597 S.E.2d at 195-96.
65. Walker, 399 F.3d at 328 n.2 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (citing Burns 1, 597 S.E.2d at 196).
66. Walker, 399 F.3d at 325.
67. No. 020971, 2005 WL 564114, at *1 (Va. Mar. 11, 2005).
68. See Bums v. Warden, No. 020971, 2005 WL 564114, at *1-*3 (Va. Mar. 11, 2005)
[hereinafter Burns I] (omitting any reference to the Equal Protection Clause in holding that Bums,
who had raised his mental-retardation claim for the first time in his state habeas petition, was
entitled to a jury determination of his mental-retardation claim on remand).
69. See Walker, 399 F.3d at 325 (finding that Virginia Code section 8.01-654.2 does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause); Burns II, 2005 WL 564114, at *1-'2 (omitting any reference to the
Equal Protection Clause).
70. Walker, 399 F.3d at 325.
71. 604 S.E.2d 21 (Va. 2004).
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able doubt.72 Both opinions concluded that mental retardation is not the equiva-
lent of an element of death-eligible capital murder under Ring.73 Thus, both
federal and state defendants will continue to have difficulty asserting that any of
Ring's requirements apply to mental-retardation determinations.
V. Conclusion
The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred when it dismissed
Walker's mental-retardation claim without an evidentiary hearing and remanded
the claim to the district court for such a hearing. 4 The court indicated that it was
error for the district court to disregard evidence introduced by the defendant
concerning the standard error of measurement inherent in I.Q. tests and- con-
cerning the "Flynn Effect. 7 ' The court also concluded that neither Virginia's
statutory scheme nor the Constitution required that a jury determine Walker's
mental-retardation claim on remand.76 Although the court's holding with respect
to jury determinations is potentially adverse to defendants, it has limited applica-
tion in Virginia because, for all future cases, state courts must permit a jury to
determine a defendant's mental-retardation claim if his trial is held before a jury.
77
Justin B. Shane
72. Winston v. Commonwealth, 604 S.E.2d 21, 50-51 (Va. 2004).
73. See Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 50 ("Proof of the lack of mental retardation is not an element
of a capital offense in Virginia, nor is it an aggravating factor in sentencing."); Walker, 399 F.3d at
326 (" '[A]n increase' in a defendant's sentence is not predicated on the outcome of the mental
retardation determination; only a decrease." (alteration in original)).
74. IWalker, 399 F.3d at 327.
75. Id. at 322-23.
76. Id. at 324-25.
77. VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-264.3:1.1(C) (Michie 2004).
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